The Politics of Citizenship in Nepal

The Politics of Citizenship in Nepal
August 6th, 2006
By Pramod Mishra , 08-Mar-02
The recent Citizenship Bill, passed by the ruling Nepali Congress, has already provoked strong criticism. The Bill’s stark contradiction stems from the abstention even by the Nepal Sadbhavana Party, for whom the issue of the rights of the Taraiwasi has been crucial for its raison d’être. The rest of the opposition parties, too, just walked out on the Bill when it came back to the Lower House after its rejection in the Upper House. Having passed the Bill by using its Whip, the Congress told the people of the Tarai that it and it alone is the true benefactor and representative of their interests. In short, it played politics, even though the initiative needs to be recognized. And the result of this politics is that the Bill might eventually fail to become law and spell trouble for Nepal’s unity.
The issue of people’s right within any political boundary, one of the most vexed issues in modern history, ought to have been handled better. The Jews and the Gypsies, even after centuries of habitation in Europe, remained deprived of the rights of citizenship. They could occupy only those marginal professions that others didn’t want; the state and its dominant population regularly subjected them to pogroms.
In the Third World, the biography of nation-states is mired in the messy politics of colonialism and the expediency that followed decolonization. Whatever one may think of King Prithvi’s successful efforts to unify Nepal, the Company government in India determined Nepal’s territorial boundary. We can only imagine the scenario if King Prithvi, Bahadur Shah and Bhimsen Thapa’s expansionist ambitions had not been later contained by the British in the treaty of Sugauli in 1816 and the Ganges were the natural border between India and Nepal. There would have been, for all justifiable reasons, another Uttarakhand movement in what is today Nepal. But the historical fact is that the treaty of Sugauli occurred and Jung Bahadur managed to form a strategic alliance with the British to let his domain alone, and Nepal came to survive in its present shape.
But the logic of nation-state formation in Europe on the basis of the identification of territory with one religion, one language, and a vague notion of one culture is flawed. And this European monster, given as a gift of colonialism to the rest of the world, has wreaked havoc in Africa, all over South Asia, let alone Europe itself. If one looks over South Asia, one can see the damage this flawed concept has done to almost all the countries there—India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, etc. And Nepal seems to be on its way to join its South Asian fraternity. In Nepal, one language, one literature, one ethnicity, one religion cannot be the grounds on which the state could safely be based for a trouble-free future.
There is one criterion, however, that could be successfully applied to justify Nepal’s independent, sovereign entity. And that is its historical justification. Because Nepal remained historically independent due to geographical difficulties, the strategies of the Rana rulers, and its own successful survival so far, it is and must always remain an independent nation-state with its own complex, evolving existence. And then, there are numerous other tangible benefits of staying a sovereign entity, besides a matter of pride and identity. But its geopolitical and geocultural reality also means that Nepal will always have to confront India in defining and imagining its nationhood and identity. Frankly, I do not know of any other nation-state that has such an open border with another country without any artificial, natural or ethnic barriers, with such open-border crossings from both sides.
But the history of sovereignty and biography of nation-states in the world have been dynamic historical processes, even though in political rhetoric the ideology may have been posed as timeless, immutable, and natural. Each dynamic nation-state has to evolve and redefine its image and reconceptualize its tenets in order to make smooth transition from one historical era to another. The world over, the tenure of nation-states has been uneven, but even within this unevenness, one can easily notice a few general trends. There are some nation-states, for example, that have possessed internal dialogic dynamic by virtue of the existence of institutions and cultures of open debate engaged in by their more informed civil society; they have been constantly in dialogue with themselves about their past, present and future identities and aspirations. As a result, they have successfully negotiated their rocky journey through history with periods of difficult transitions and crises, which the very nature of nation-state’s artificiality and constructedness occasions.
The dominance of nation-state as an organizing principle and reference point of thinking has more or less come to an end in a globalized world, even though the movement of capital and labor has not been the same across national boundaries. The Europeans, who fought numerous bloody wars with each other until recently, have once again taken the lead and formed the European Union, merging parts of their currencies, travel, citizenship, etc (even Germany has amended its citizenship laws), while retaining the basic structures of their sovereignty. Europe has formed this dual structure in order to face two rivals: the rise of the United States as a global power, on the one hand, and the potential prominence in the future of India, China, and other South East Asian countries. Where does Nepal, the yam between two boulders, stand in the company of nation-states in the post-Soviet world?
In Nepal, the issue of citizenship should not become for any one party to take credit for at the expense of others, nor a battering ram for one group against another. What are the benefits and losses of giving citizenship to people who have been living in Nepal for decades? Is the fear of many Nepalis justified that if citizenship laws are made logical, population from the populous neighboring states of Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar would overflow and overpower Nepal’s fundamental identity, marginalizing its own people? What would be the repercussions of this Bill in the rest of South Asia? What should be the right procedure for giving citizenship as a matter of people’s right rather than a humiliating experience? And who should be authorized to do so and why? All these and many such questions should have been debated in public before passing the Bill. A multiparty consensus ought to have been sought. At the end of the day, some parties might have opposed the Bill but the public at large would have been educated.
The fear of the loss of sovereignty needs to be thoroughly addressed in order to logically dispel such fears and defeat the vested interests of groups that have so far used ultra nationalist rhetoric, as in other places, to serve their narrow ethnic, caste, class and political ends. Because of the dominance of bureaucracy in Nepal’s public life, an imitation of the colonial rule in India and its model afterward, the people at the grassroots have little say in public matters. As a result, many who deserve citizenship have been deprived of it and others who have had easy access to towns and money have obtained it.
Not a single person who does not qualify for citizenship, whatever the agreed and debated qualification, should be given one just because the person has access to power, towns, and money. On the other hand, those who deserve, those who have lived in Nepal for several decades, serving and bringing together people of diverse ethnicities, even before Nepal’s national identity acquired its Panchayati contours, those for whom Nepal is not just another place to exploit by using its name but the only place, must get citizenship without delay and with all dignity and respect. Any delay is a violation of their human rights.
There are clear benefits of passing courageous, realistic, and unambiguous laws about citizenship in Nepal. The biggest achievement of this Bill would be the strengthening of the cohesiveness of the country in its multicultural paradigm. The Bhutanese refugee problem would, then, have clear moral as well as political direction. Nepal can then tell other nations in South Asia that they need to respect the people within their political boundaries as equal participants. Nepal can also compel India to persuade the Bhutanese authorities to resolve the Bhutanese refugee crisis by passing laws that would recognize the rights of the Bhutanese citizens of Nepali origin. Bhutan can no longer go on violating the human rights of its people. But as long as Nepal does not pass clear laws of citizenship for its own people, it not only would have no moral and political clout to resolve the Bhutanese refugee problem but the possibility of other refugees—such as Sikkimese, Assamese, Meghalayee or Manipuri, etc, of Nepali origin—would always hang as a sword over Nepal.
What’s more, if no Bill is passed, the Tarai problem will only fester. The wrong people with wrong intent will obtain citizenship anyway through power, access, and money, as they have always done. So far, the acquisition of Nepali citizenship has been a farce in the hands of Nepal’s bureaucracy.
In all this, Nepal needs to conduct its affairs with dignity, vision, and fortitude, like a genuinely sovereign nation-state. It cannot behave like another Indian state, such as the Assam of the seventies or Kashmir of today or any other small, geographically isolated ethnic enclave, like Uttarkhand of UP or Bodoland of Assam. It needs to put forward bold plans before the Indian government along with the administrations of Bihar, Bengal, and Uttar Pradesh for monitoring and provisioning for each other’s population movements into each other’s territories so that both India and Nepal can better manage their populations and envisage new policies and programs for them. It may be a misfortune for Nepal to be adjacent to Bihar but it is an inescapable geopolitical reality. The case of Bihar is a doomed one. And the possibility is that the moral chaos, expediency, caste-ism, and culture of hooliganism of the Biharis might soon overcome Nepal, if Nepal’s politicians and intellectuals do not take timely action and guide the Tarai away from the invisible clutches of Bihar.
On the other hand, as long as Bihar, Bengal, and UP (but particularly Bihar) do not get their acts together, Nepal will only hobble despite massive inflow of foreign aids. Nepal’s education system has failed partly because of the chaos in education in Bihar; Nepal’s administration has stumbled partly because Bihar’s corrupt example in running its system has only added to Nepal’s all too readiness to emulate its neighbor; and Nepal’s Parliament is showing all the signs of emulating the behaviors of Bihari politicians. To be historically independent and sovereign is not enough to stay sovereign and independent; nor is it enough to shout ultra nationalist slogans. Both complacency and fascism ultimately lead to damage to the long-term interests of the nation-state. A complex, landlocked Nepal needs to formulate a proactive national agenda in place of reactionary nationalism. As a long-time independent entity, unlike its South Asian neighbors, it is Nepal’s responsibility to lead by example by adopting innovative ways to solve its internal and external problems. So far, Nepal has been just trying to walk in the muddy and bloody footsteps of the rest of South Asia; it hasn’t looked seriously at the resilience and capacity of its cultures and peoples.
Therefore, let Nepal be a talking nation rather than one of silent and violent dictates, a dynamic one rather than one hijacked by conspiracy mongers and ultra nationalists, a bold nation ready to take on the challenges of the twenty-first century by taking rational, progressive steps rather than timid ones. It cannot lead a healthy national life by living in perennial fear of dissolution and disappearance. At any rate, Nepal needs to do the right thing with regard to the issue of citizenship for people who have lived in Nepal for several decades and have nowhere else to go.
(P. Mishra teaches academic writing at Duke University)

POLITICS-NEPAL: Now Ethnic Separatism

POLITICS-NEPAL: Now Ethnic Separatism
August 21st, 2006

Suman Pradhan-

KATHMANDU, Aug 21 (IPS) - A splinter Maoist faction in Nepal’s southern Terai plains is calling for full sovereignty and independence in what is turning to be the first separatist movement in the country’s history.

The Terai Jantantrik Liberation Front (TJLF), led by former Maoist Jayakrishna Goit, has been battling Maoists since 2004 for control of the Terai agenda. But, to the dismay of many, his group has recently been hounding settlers from the hills, locally known as ‘Pahadiyas’, in a bid to drive them out of the Terai.

An impoverished, landlocked country facing a violent Maoist insurgency since 1996, Nepal can ill afford a separatist movement just when it is seeking to resolve the Maoist conflict. But ignorance of Terai grievances, where 48 percent the country’s 26 million people live, is fanning the flames of radicalism and separatism. Goit’s slogan that the Terai, known as Madhes, is only for the Madhesis is igniting fears of a separatist war and deepening the hills-plains divide in this country. Madhesis are people of Indian origin who have settled in the Terai for decades. Most are Nepali citizens but a huge number lack citizenship.

The separatism is being fuelled by two distinct factors: Goit’s fight with the Maoists, and the age-old discrimination felt by the Madhesi community at large. Last week, Goit gave voice to those feelings when he told a group of journalists, “We are fighting for independence because we have been discriminated against for too long.”

Goit’s separatist activities so far have been confined to only a handful of Terai districts, mostly in areas from Saptari to Rautahat in the east-central Terai.

Spanning Nepal’s entire south from east to west, the Terai is Nepal’s industrial and agricultural bread basket. For long dormant, as exclusion and inequalities within the hill community gained top priority in the national agenda, Terai grievances suddenly flared up in June when TJLF fighters kidnapped for ransom several Pahadiya government officers and forcibly closed down a few industries owned by Pahadiya settlers in Saptari district.

A July 2006 U.N. report by the Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs, states: “The situation was rather volatile in Terai districts, especially in early June. The Janatantrik Terai Liberation Front (sic), a Maoist break away, issued threats against the hill ethnic groups settled in the Terai, asking them to go back to their villages.”

While Nepal remains focused on the difficulties surrounding delicate negotiations between the government and Maoist rebels, the Terai districts are on the brink of an upheaval. The issues encompass not only Maoist in-fighting but identity politics and a sense of discrimination felt by the Madhesis.

The trend is worrying Terai intellectuals and activists who oppose the dismemberment of Nepal. They argue that Nepal should remain united, and its leaders must address discrimination lest separatist tendencies grow.

“There is no support in the Madhesi community for an independent Madhes. We all want to be part of Nepal,” asserts Vijay Kant Karna, a Madhesi lecturer of political science and chairman of Jaghrit Nepal, a Madheshi-upliftment group. “But I cannot say what will happen in the future if Madhesis do not get due recognition in the state restructuring that is being talked about.”

“We Madhesis are looked down upon. Our language and culture are not respected. We are not represented adequately in the civil administration and other state institutions. These must stop or the fire will only grow,” says Jayaprakash Gupta, a Madhesi former government minister who is now general secretary of the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF).

A lifelong communist, Goit was lured into the Maoist fold by top Madhesi Maoist leader Matrika Prasad Yadav. Appointed the first chairman of the Maoists’ Terai Liberation Front, Goit split the Front in late 2004 and formed the TJLF after Yadav replaced him as chairman. The TJLF has an estimated 150-200 fighters.

People who have known Goit for years say the TJLF leader took up his radical agenda after falling out with the Maoists over three major issues - his replacement by Yadav in the Maoists’ Terai Liberation Front, anti-Madhesi discrimination even within the Maoist hierarchy, and the Maoists’ division of Madhes into two separate regions - the Madhes autonomous region which spans east to west-central Nepal, and Tharuwan autonomous region which encompasses western Terai.

“Goit was dissatisfied by the discrimination practiced by the Maoists within their own ranks. Very few Madhesis got leadership roles in the party’s organizational structure in Madhes. Almost all were sent from the hills,” says Karna.

“There was plenty of discrimination which resulted in dissatisfaction,” agrees Maoist leader Yadav. But now, Yadav asserts, these issues have largely been addressed.

But whatever rectification measures the Maoists implanted, Goit remained unsatisfied. Having lost his leadership position, and disagreeing vehemently with the Maoists’ division of Madhes, he split and formed the TJLF.

“Nepal’s ruling elites have forever been suspicious of Madhes because they think these people are of Indian origin, and therefore pro-Indian,” says MJF leader Gupta “That is not true. We Madhesis are as much Nepali and pro-Nepal as anyone else. But I am not surprised that Goit is seeing this division of Madhes by the Maoists as an attempt by the Pahadiyas to diffuse Madhes’ power. I too think that is the case.”

Even Maoist leader Yadav struggles to accept this division. “I am in favour of a unified Madhes,” he says. “But I also believe there can be separate regions within a unified Madhes. (END/2006)
Source::http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34406

The Politics Of State Restructuring

The Politics Of State Restructuring
By C. D. Bhatta

Editorial, The Rising Nepal, 2006-9-1

The issue of state restructuring has dominated the Nepali political discourse since the last couple of months. Nevertheless it has not been defined scientifically to set some parameters. This has left ample space for maneuvering the issue by the political parties and their leaders. When I asked a well-known political scientist at Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, Dev Raj Dahal, he said this is moving towards ’substantive democracy’.

Territorial restructuring
Literature rather stresses that one cannot change fundamental features of the state vis-୶is the concrete territory; independent foreign and economic policy; existing distribution (location) of population and its organic identity merely to balance the imbalances. It generates some fundamental questions though as what ’state restructuring’ is all about and how it can be done so that state does not falter away in the future. That for a layman is perplexing enough, as one may welter whether it is linked with territorial restructuring of the state or internal democratisation of the state machinery.

Clearly, state restructuring is something that is directly associated with political re-imagination of the state as per the spirit of the time and is a continuous process in democracy. It primarily hinges on three organs of the state - the judiciary, legislature and the executive body. It deals with how best all the three organs of the state can be made more representative and pro-public so that more and more citizens are collectively taken into the institutional life of the state and no group/caste/ethnicity/religion is left behind. Rather some sort of ownership of the state is regenerated.

It is true that the corollary of state restructuring is far sighted and demands rigorous discussions on issues which have metaphorically impinged heavily on making the state more participatory, representative and pro-public before jumping into any conclusion. The state can be restructured in many ways - it can be transformed from a capitalist to a welfare one; from unitary to federalism; and from single party to multiparty democracy. There can be internal readjustments of the electoral constituencies, devolution of power to the local government(s), the state can be more democratised (inclusive democracy) and it can develop special arrangements for those who are historically left behind in the development paradigm. But the state cannot be restructured principally on the basis of fault lines (such as ethnicity, religion, population and even geography to some extent) which pose substantial threat to national unity in the event of mismanagement. These are some but key elements that need to be taken into account while restructuring the existing nature of the state.

Restructuring of the state is a continuous process in a democracy as the internal shape of the state need to be attuned to the spirit of the time and popular wish engendered both by the internal forces (movements per se) and external forces (globalisation per se). What has to be borne in mind basically is that the Westminster political edict of ‘winner takes all (majoritarian politics)’ should cease to exist, at least in countries like Nepal, in an endeavour to bring all the societal forces into the institutional life of the state. However, for this to happen, not only is internal political restructuring of the state necessary, but an inclusive political culture must also be instilled in the ruling classes. This will help to reconstruct a ‘commonwealth’ of the people (the mythical Ram Rajya) as against the Hobbesian state.

Paradoxically, the way the debate on state restructuring is taking place in Nepal is somewhat worrying as it posits more questions and challenges than it answers. Issues beyond the capacity of any state, let alone Nepal, are surfacing and their semanticity is attached less with the democratisation process and more with identity politics. The simultaneous emergence of ‘nationalities’ and vague political agenda of state restructuring have become major tactics to sustain the conflict rather than accommodating all the societal forces. In one way or the other, the country is moving towards communal politics.

The restructuring agendas have more ethnic flavour and less democratic values. This bias in understanding is further augmented by demands generated by the janjaties, ethnicities, dalits, nationalities; linguisticity, religiosity that have emerged at the transitional threshold; and haphazard proposition of geographical division of the state by the professional political elite (parties). It has been taken for granted that ‘federalism’ is the panacea for all problems as against the unitary state of the yesteryear which failed to establish a connection between the Kathmandu city state and the peripheral sub-states.

But is it really so that federalism deciphers all problems? What happens if the federal states are taken as private enterprises by the political elite? This is likely to happen unless there is a substantial change in the behaviour of politicians. Does the debate on state restructuring really hold water to keep the Nepali state moving ahead without any further cycles of violence? These are some but pertinent questions that remain unanswered. In fact, the state restructuring agenda should include sustainable and cohesive intermingling of the people of different regions, religions, castes and ethnicities. That said we just cannot restructure the state for a particular class, ethnic group, religion, region or language, which will prove suicidal in the long run.

Perception change
A scientific mechanism should be developed so as to represent those who are not well represented, particularly the janjatis, dalits and madhesi community in politics, bureaucracy and alike. Moreover, the people’s perception must change that things are wrong just because of a particular class, caste or religion (e.g. Brahmins, Chhetris and Hinduism). One must analyse his/her own weaknesses. The ‘nationalities’ including the donors accuse the Nepali bureaucracy of being usurped by Brahmins and Chhetris, but mind you, Gurungs, Rais, Magars and others are little interested in taking up government jobs.

In conclusion, every society has its own weaknesses, but they have to be rectified collectively with due sincerity by respecting each other. What we need at the end of the day is: a cohesive, tolerant and harmonious state and society. Overall, conflicts are resolved for perpetual peace (Kantian peace) not for perpetual war.

Another war erupts in Nepal

Another war erupts in Nepal
Sudeshna Sarkar
KATHMANDU,
- Four months after the Maoists and the new government of Nepal called a ceasefire, violence continues to erupt in southern Nepal, raising the spectre of another insurgency. Yesterday, gunfight broke out in Siraha district in south-eastern Nepal as Maoists clashed with a newly formed outfit, the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha, and took captive a senior Morcha leader, Ram Bilas Yadav. Last month, the Morcha killed two Maoist leaders and abducted a government official, releasing him only after his family paid a ransom. The modus operandi of the Morcha seems to be patterned upon the Maoist method when the guerrillas began their “People’s War” 10 years ago. That’s hardly surprising, considering the fact that the Morcha is a disgruntled group that broke away from the Maoists two years ago under the leadership of Jaya Krishna Goit, who comes from Saptari district in southern Nepal. The Maoist war and its success has spawned a Madhesh war in Nepal with Madeshis ~ people of the terai plains ~ claiming their rights. There are no plains people in the army and just a handful in the bureaucracy and judiciary when plains people form about half of Nepal’s 27 million population. About 50,000 plains people have two citizenship, though they have been living in Nepal for generations, therefore cut off from government jobs, elections and the upcoming constituent assembly election that would decide Nepal’s future. Many of the plains people, who were once part of the Maoist revolt and suffered most at the hands of security forces, are now disenchanted with the guerrillas, accusing them of concentrating the leadership.The Nepal Sadbhavana Party, the only political party from the plains that is now a partner in the coalition government with a powerful minister in the cabinet, concedes Goit has just cause for grievance, Mr Rajendra Mahato, an MP from the party, has been urging both the government and the Maoists to call Goit for talks. “Peace talks shouldn’t take place piecemeal,” Mr Mahat says. “If the terai issues are not addressed, Nepal would know no peace in spite of the Maoist ceasefire. Ten years ago, no one listened to the Maoists. But after they took up the gun, they are getting a red carpet treatment. The example is spurring on the youth of terai and in another five years, the movement would escalate, just as the Maoist war did.”

The Problems Of Citizenship In Terai

We Want To Solve The Problems Of Citizenship In Terai On A Broader Basis’
-- RAJENDRA MAHATO
General Secretary of Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi) and parliamentary party leader RAJENDRA MAHATO represents Constituency 2 of Sarlahi district. Well educated general secretary Mahato is known as frank politician. He spoke to KESHAB POUDEL on various issues regarding the problems of citizenship certificate and other issues of Terai region. Excerpts:
How do you see the recent proclamation of House of Representatives to issue the citizenship certificate on the basis of mother's citizenship? Will it have any effect in Terai?
So far as the proclamation is concerned, it is historic in terms of guaranteeing the equal rights to women and some reservations to them. But, this resolution does not have anything to do with the problems related to citizenship in terai. Frankly speaking, the resolution is not to address the citizenship problems in terai. I don't think it will bring any substantial changes in the present state of citizenship problems. We want to solve the problems of citizenship in terai on a broader basis not on the piece-meal manner. Anyway, the resolution addresses only the problems related to women's right.
How do you see the problems of terai?
Although the historic proclamation of the House of Representatives also has the clause related to the citizenship, it is not enough to guarantee the citizenship right of people living in terai. Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi) will table a resolution in parliament to translate the proclamation's commitment into reality. The proposed resolution will address the inclusive democracy and restructuring of the state on the basis of wishes expressed in People's Movement II. If we are unable to address the problems of terai, it will be betrayal to the Madhesis and the country and political parties will have to pay heavy prices for this. If all the problems of terai are not solved in democratic and peaceful manner, the violent groups will lead the movement. The organization like Terai Jantantrik Forum has already come into force in terai.
Some oppose the recent resolution saying it would pave the way for demographic change allowing the children of women marrying with foreigners to become citizens?
I told you that this is not going to solve the problems of citizenship in terai. There is nothing to resort to hue and cry.
Could you elaborate on the citizenship problems in Terai?
The problems of citizenship certificate have been there for long time in Madhesh (Terai) as a large number of Madhesis are yet to get the citizenship certificate. According to a report of High-level Citizenship Commission formed under the chairmanship of CPN-UML leader Dhanpati Upadhayay in 1995, there were about 3.4 million people without citizenship certificate and overwhelming of them are from Madhesh. In accordance to demographic change, the number may be now more than 5 million and overwhelming majority of these people are from terai.
Many people say the figure is highly exaggerated? How do you look at it?
We don't need to exaggerate the figure. You can go and see how difficult it is for the people of terai to get the citizenship certificate. Many people who have been living in terai for centuries have been denied the right of citizenship certificate. The laws are discriminatory against the people living in terai. Our party has been raising these issues for more than two decades.
Do you believe that the present parliament and the government will announce some package to solve the citizenship problems?
The proclamation has already made it clear that there is a need to solve the problems of citizenship certificate. Before the elections of Constituent Assembly, the government must issue citizenship certificate to all the Madheshis who don't have it.
How do you see the visit of prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala to India ?
Being two close neighbors, the visit of this kind helps to enhance bilateral friendly relations between the two countries. The relations between Nepal and India are very unique in the sense that both the countries share many commonalities. The people to people relation between two countries is centuries-old, which is bound by culture, religion, ethnicity and geography. The open border between Nepal and India is another major feature of two countries.
There is also demand to regulate open border between the two countries. How do you look at it?
A handful of persons in the valley have been raising these kinds of unnecessary demand without understanding the ground realities of terai region. Since Nepal and India border is geographically unique like our relationship, it will have far reaching consequences in the life of people living in terai who have several ties and frequent interactions with the people living on the other side of border. It is impossible to close the borders. Open border is the question of life and death of people living in terai region. Some people with vested interest always criticize open border to fan anti-India feelings. The open border is benefiting more to people living in terai than people living in Indian side of border. Kathmandu valley is not Nepal and people living in the valley do not understand contribution made by open border in the life of people living in terai. We must develop plans and programs to gain advantages from open border with India .
How do you see the efforts made by Nepal and India to exploit the benefits of open border?
For centuries the people living across the border are sharing the benefits as well as difficulties together. Since people living on two sides of border have similar culture, religion, language and ethnicity, they have many commonalities of interest. The manmade border line does not stop their interactions. People have their own system and ways to share the benefits, the governments of both the countries need to facilitate to make it easier. For Nepal , high economic growth rate across the border is going to become a boon. We must start to think the development in border areas from broader economic perspective.

Inclusion of the excluded Madheshis

Inclusion of the excluded Madheshis
-Hari Bansh Jha

Exclusion is a process in which certain groups are systematically disadvantaged and are discriminated on the basis of ethnicity, race, religion, sex, caste, descent, gender, age, disability and other such factors. It deprives such groups of choices and opportunities in social, economic and political spheres, which is a major cause of poverty, conflict and insecurity. In many countries, such a phenomenon is quite distinct in public institutions, legal system, education and health services.
At the global level, 891 million people are victims of discrimination on the basis of the ethnic, linguistic and religious identities. As in many other countries, in Nepal too, various groups of people have been excluded and marginalized socially, culturally, economically and politically due to the exclusionary policy of the state. Even after half-a-century of planning experiment, only a few ethnic and caste groups dominate the power structure as they have administrative and political connections, income, educational and cultural advantages and ability to capture public resources. As a legacy of exclusion, poverty incidence is high among several ethnic groups, including the Madheshis in Nepal.
In the Ninth Plan (1997-2002), the government came out with policies for the development of certain ethnic groups but it failed to recognize Madheshis as excluded group despite the fact that they are victims of discrimination in social, economic and political structure. The Madheshis who constitute nearly one-third of Nepal’s total population (31 percent) are in most disadvantageous position. The per capita income of the Nepalese is Rs. 17,040 or US $ 240; while the same is Rs. 13,200 for the Madheshi Dalits, Rs. 12,700 for the Madheshi Janajatis and Rs. 10,200 for the Madheshi Muslims.
Among the Madheshis, about 37 per cent of the Dalits and 32 per cent of the Janajatis do not won agricultural land. Among the Terai Dalit groups, 79 per cent of the Musahars are landless and the literacy rate among them is as low as 7 per cent. Similarly, female literacy rate in Madheshi Dalit and Muslim women is as low as 11 per cent. On the whole, 79 per cent of the Dalits, 54 per cent of the Janajatis and 42 per cent of the mid caste population in Terai are illiterate.
A study conducted by International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) clearly exhibits worst condition of Madheshis in terms of poverty and deprivation in nine Terai districts, including in Saptari, Siraha, Dhanusha, Mahottari, Sarlahi, Rautahat, Parsa, Bardiya and Kailali. These nine districts in the Terai are among the 25 districts identified as worst districts at the national level by ICIMOD. This brings these Terai districts in the same category of remote mountain and hill districts like Achham, Kalikot, Dailekh, Mugu, Bajhang, Humla, Jumla, Jajarkot, Baitadi and Rolpa. Even the conditions of some of the remote districts like Nuwakot, Darchula, Pyuthan, Dolpa and Myagadi which are in the intermediate category; and Parbat, Lamjung, Sankhuwasabha and Mustang ranked in best category are in better position than the nine worst districts of the Terai.
Unfortunately, it is out of fashion rather than due to the seriousness of purpose that some of the highly resourceful organizations like the World Bank (WB) and Department for International Development (DFID) have raised the issue of inclusion of the excluded groups. Many of facts and figures presented in the DFID/WB report in regard to Madheshis are erroneous. For example, the Brahmins, Rajputs, Kayasthas, Baniyas, Marwaris and Bengalis are put in the Brahmin-Chhetri (BC) category. How can the caste groups like Baniyas be put in BC category? Similarly, there is no rational as such in putting the Marwaris and Bengalis in BC category? These two communities – the Marwaris and Bengalis – are composite groups which consists all the caste groups from Brahmins to Sudras and as such it is not fair to confuse them with BC category. Even a layman having some understanding of caste groups of Madheshis cannot make such a blunder.
Even from economic perspective, question arises about the way the per capita income of the Madheshi caste groups has been accounted. The per capita income of 1.9 per cent of the so called upper caste Madheshis such as Brahmins, Rajputs, Kayasthas, Baniyas and Marwaris is given as Rs. 23,900, which is higher than the national average per capita income of Rs. 17,040. There is no rational as such to put the so called upper caste Madheshi community such as Brahmins, Rajputs and Kayasthas in the same category as Baniyas and Marwaris as they belong to two distinct economic classes. While the Brahmins, Rajputs and Kayasthas are basically priests/farmers/service holders; the Baniyas, Marwaris and Jains are mostly the business communities.
Moreover, the higher income of the Baniyas, Marwaris and Jains is likely to inflate the income of the other groups such as Brahmins, Rajputs and Kayasthas if the per capita income of these two distinct groups is put together. The question is how can the income of Marwari/Jain groups such as Kedia, Golchha, Mittal and other be equated with Brahmins, Kayasthas and Rajputs who belong to entirely different economic class and whose sources of income also vary?
It is equally faulty on the part of the report to segregate the Madheshi Dalits and Janajatis with the other Madheshi community in the Terai. In the Madheshi community, certain caste groups like the Brahmins, Kayasthas, Sudi, Teli and Yadavs have been put; whereas the Madheshi Dalits and Janajatis have been put separately as if they belong to non-Madheshi group. What is the logic of excluding the Madheshi Dalits and Janajatis from the Madheshi community as a whole? The Madheshi Dalits and Janajatis are as good Madheshis as any other caste groups in the region.
Recently, under the Norwegian fund, the SNV Nepal has treated Madheshis as excluded groups and jumped into race by allotting funds for researches. It is likely that many of the INGOs, bilateral and multilateral donor agencies might follow the suit. But in practice these organizations themselves exclude the Madheshis in the recruitment and decision-making process. What percentage of their total staff is Madheshi?
The WB, DFID, SNV Nepal and host of other bilateral and multilateral institutions preach one thing and do quite different. It is not likely to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and attain peace in the post-conflict situation so long as the Madheshi ethnic groups along with other such disadvantaged groups are excluded from the social, economic and political mainstream and in decision making process.